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The Morality of ConflictPDF电子书下载

外文

• 作 者：
• 出 版 社：Hart Publishing LimitedInternational Specialized Book Services [Distributor]
• 出版年份：2005
• ISBN：9781841134925;1841134929
• 页数：601 页

图书介绍： 查看图书目录点击购买PDF全本电子书 上一篇：CHILDREN’S STRESS AND COPING A FAMILY PERSPECTIVE下一篇：VALUE CREATION IN MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE 《The Morality of Conflict》目录 标签：

Introduction1

Ⅰ.The issue1

Ⅱ.The significance7

Ⅲ.The approach10

Ⅳ.The structure12

PART ONE:THE NATURE OF DISAGREEMENT17

1.The Notion and Types of Disagreement19

Introduction19

Ⅰ.The notion of disagreement19

Ⅱ.The types of disagreement22

1.Political-moral disagreement22

2.The scope of political morality24

a.Rawls’ separation of political morality from comprehensive moral doctrines25

ⅰ.RaMs’ overlapping consensus25

ⅱ.Rawls’ way out27

ⅲ.A revised Rawlsian model of political-moral disagreement30

b.Habermas’ separation of ethical-political discourse from moral debates31

ⅰ.The early Habermas and the problem of political-moral disagreement33

ⅱ.The late Habermas and the separation of the moral from the ethical36

Ⅲ.The fact of disagreement and the ontological challenge39

1.The challenge39

2.The challenge’s defeasibility41

3.Learning from the challenge44

Conclusion45

2.The Sources of Disagreement and Legal Indeterminacy47

Introduction47

Ⅰ.The sources of disagreement47

1.Verbal lack of agreement48

2.Conceptual disagreement48

a.Borderline disagreement50

b.Pivotal disagreement51

3.Normative disagreement52

a.Epistemic disagreement53

b.Metaphysical disagreement54

i.From value conflict to metaphysical disagreement54

ii.Types of metaphysical disagreement55

Ⅱ.From moral disagreement to legal indeterminacy57

1.The debate57

2.The notion of indeterminacy59

a.Indeterminacy,uncertainty and objectivity59

b.From moral to legal indeterminacy62

c.Types of legal indeterminacy64

3.The relationship between disagreement and legal indeterminacy65

Conclusion66

3.The Essential Contestability of Normative Concepts69

Introduction69

Ⅰ.The concept of’essentially contestable concept’72

Ⅱ.The sources of essential contestability74

1.Verbal lack of agreement75

2.Conceptual disagreement75

a.Borderline disagreement75

b.Pivotal disagreement78

3.Normative disagreement80

Ⅲ.Minimal agreement in understanding and disputable paradigms81

1.Minimal agreement in understanding82

2.The disputability of paradigms84

3.Shared paradigms and conceptual truth86

Conclusion88

4.The Reasonableness of Disagreement91

Introduction91

Ⅰ.The notion of reasonableness91

1.Three caveats92

2.Four distinctions93

a.Reasonableness and rationality93

b.Public reasonableness and private reasonableness95

c.Person-based reasonableness and content-based reasonableness96

ⅰ.The distinction in general96

ⅱ.The person-based account of reasonableness97

ⅲ.The content-based account of reasonableness98

d.Actualist reasonableness and probabilistic reasonableness99

3.Three illustrations101

a.Rawls’ partisan conception of public reason101

b.Habermas’ transcendental conception of reasonableness103

c.Gutmann and Thompson’s reciprocal conception of public reason104

Ⅱ.The significance of reason105

1.The value of the reasonable105

a.A pragmatic legitimation:stability and cooperation106

b.An epistemological legitimation:the search for truth107

c.A moral legitimation:mutual justification107

ⅰ.Individual justification108

ⅱ.Public justification108

2.The limits of the reasonable110

Ⅲ.The burdens of reason111

Ⅳ.The implications of reasonable disagreement113

1.The challenge of internal scepticism113

2.From the inconclusiveness of public reason to alternative modes of political legitimation115

3.The benefits of reasonable pluralism and the living rule of law116

Conclusion118

PART TWO:THE SIGNIFICANCE OF DISAGREEMENT121

5.The State of Nature Fiction123

Introduction123

Ⅰ.The fiction as argument124

1.General124

2.Setting the scene:the state of nature126

a.Hobbes’state of nature126

b.Rousseau’s state of nature128

c.Kant’s state of nature131

d.Hume’s state of nature133

3.Introducing the problem:the extent of disagreement137

a.Hobbes’ account of the extent of disagreement137

b.Rousseau’s account of the extent of disagreement139

c.Kant’s account of the extent of disagreement141

d.Hume’s account of the extent of disagreement145

4.Judging the situation:the significance of disagreement147

a.Hobbes’ account of the significance of disagreement147

b.Rousseau’s account of the significance of disagreement149

c.Kant’s account of the significance of disagreement151

d.Hume’s account of the significance of disagreement152

Ⅱ.Some non-fictional objections155

1.From the conceptual truth to the fact of disagreement155

2.Some empirical objections156

Conclusion159

6.Disagreement as a Source of Coordination Problems161

Introduction161

Ⅰ.Coordination problems and why we need to solve them164

1.The need for coordination164

a.The desirability of coordination165

b.The possibility of coordination167

2.Coordination problems168

a.General considerations of collective action168

b.The Prisoner’s Dilemma171

c.Pure coordination problems172

d.Partial conflict coordination problems173

3.The resolution of coordination problems176

a.The need to solve coordination problems and the moral case for determinatio176

b.From the need to coordinate to the reasons to solve coordination problems178

c.Conscious coordination and the reasonableness of the options179

Ⅱ.Law as a way of contributing to securing coordination181

1.On legal coordination in general182

a.From natural to collective coordination182

b.From informal to formal coordination185

2.First-level coordination:the constitution of a legal order186

a.The argument187

b.The challenges189

i.From convergent behaviour to rule190

ii.Coordination and pivotal disagreement192

3.Second-level coordination:the constitution of law-making procedures195

4.Third-level coordination:the constitution of concrete laws195

Ⅲ.Coordination as law’s main function197

1.The argument198

2.The challenges200

a.The absence of all-encompassing concerted action200

b.The absence of all-encompassing need for cooperation201

Conclusion203

PART THREE:THE RESPONSE TO DISAGREEMENT205

SECTION ONE:LAW-MAKING PROCEDURES207

7.Deliberative ‘Voting Ethics’209

Introduction209

Ⅰ.The legitimacy of procedural legitimacy212

1.The issue of legitimacy212

2.The democratic paradox213

3.Epistemic populism or soft substantivism216

4.Substantive proceduralism220

a.Pure decisionism220

b.Substantively legitimate proceduralism221

ⅰ.The minimal substantive legitimation of procedural legitimacy221

ⅱ.Substantive cum contingent proceduralism222

Ⅱ.The justification of democratic deliberation223

1.The justification of democratic participation224

2.The justification of deliberation226

Ⅲ.Deliberation and disagreement228

1.Actual reasonable agreement qua regulative ideal of deliberation228

2.Deliberative disagreement229

3.Potential reasonable agreement qua internal logic of deliberation232

Ⅳ.The inescapability of voting233

1.The need for closure233

2.Various proposals of modes of closure236

a.Non-institutional modes of collective choice236

b.From institutional deliberation,through accommodation,to vote237

Ⅴ.Voting after deliberating240

1.A deliberative justification of voting240

2.The misgivings of the deliberative opposition to aggregative procedures243

Ⅵ.Deliberative ‘voting ethics’245

1.Voting ethics from within245

2.The deliberative ethics of voting:minimal decisiveness246

3.The deliberative ethics of majority rule:maximal decisiveness248

a.From unanimity,through minority rule,to majority rule248

b.The argument of maximal decisiveness250

Conclusion254

8.Four Arguments against Compromising Justice Internally257

Introduction257

Ⅰ.The concept of compromise259

1.A few distinctions259

2.A caveat:the disagreeable nature of compromise262

Ⅱ.The justification of compromise263

1.Compromise of interests264

2.Compromise of principles265

a.General265

b.Multiprinciple compromise269

c.Single-principle compromise270

Ⅲ.The limitations of compromise271

1.Inefficiency272

2.Potential injustice272

3.Concept attribution275

4.Political integrity277

Ⅳ.Democracy as a fair compromise280

1.Democracy as compromise qua process280

2.Democracy and further compromises qua outcome281

Conclusion282

SECTION TWO:LAW-MAKING INSTITUTIONS285

9.Constitutional Rights Qua Legislative Precommitment287

Introduction287

Ⅰ.A few definitions290

Ⅱ.The precommitment model of constitutional constraints292

1.Elster’s model of individual precommitment293

2.The constitutional analogy294

a.The principle of analogy295

b.The analogy applied296

Ⅲ.The limitations of the precommitment conception of constitutional constraints298

1.General298

2.The precommitting subject:Ulysses versus a majority of the voting population299

a.Ulysses versus a complex collective entity,the people299

b.Ulysses versus the intergenerational people301

3.The object of the precommitment:the charm of the sirens versus rights misconceptions302

4.The target of precommitment:individual weakness of will versus reasonable disagreement303

a.Political akrasia as precommitment main target304

b.A few limitations:reasonable disagreement versus collective akrasia305

ⅰ.The limitations305

ⅱ.Assessing the risks306

ⅲ.The paradox of constitutional precommitment309

5.The implementation of the precommitment:Ulysses’ crew qua external enforcer versus the people310

6.The operation of the precommitment:keeping someone tied versus judging rights-violations313

7.Implications for the precomrnitment model of constitutional rights315

Ⅳ.A counterobjection:the constitutionalisation of democracy316

1.Democracy-enabling and democracy-constitutive precommitment317

2.A few limitations:constitutive predecision versus constitutional precommitment319

3.Implications for the precommitment model of constitutional rights322

Ⅴ.The precommitment model revisited323

1.The different levels of entrenchment model324

a.The different rights entrenched324

b.The different tiers of entrenchment325

ⅰ.Fundamental civil and non-political rights326

ⅱ.Constitutive procedural rules and democratic rights326

2.A few built-in correctives328

a.General328

b.Flexible amendability329

c.Essentially contestable concepts330

d.The people’s last word in constitutional interpretation333

Conclusion336

10.Participation and the Paradox of Democratic Representation339

Introduction339

Ⅰ.The contours of democratic representation343

1.Notion and scope343

2.Five constitutive elements346

a.Who is represented346

b.Who the representatives are347

c.How the representatives are chosen348

d.What the representatives represent349

e.How the representatives represent352

Ⅱ.The challenge of disagreement353

1.The challenge353

a.Why disagreement should be represented353

b.How disagreement should be represented355

2.A common response:descriptive group representation356

a.From disagreement representation to descriptive representation356

b.The implementation of descriptive disagreement representation358

Ⅲ.The counterchallenge360

1.The paradox of democratic representation360

2.The counterchallenge of diversity361

Ⅳ.The representation of disagreement reconceptualised362

1.The paradoxical relationship between disagreement and representation363

2.The revised model of disagreement representation364

a.A balance of descriptive and substantive representation365

b.A balance of trusteeship and delegation367

Ⅴ.Some implications:the democratic legitimacy of representation368

Conclusion370

SECTION THREE:THE CONTENT OF LAW373

11.Integrity:Should the Law Speak With One Voice?375

Introduction375

Ⅰ.The concept of integrity378

Ⅱ.The constitutive elements of integrity382

Ⅲ.The circumstances of integrity386

1.From utopia to ordinary politics:the necessity of integrity386

2.From dystopia to ordinary politics:the plausibility of integrity387

3.Back to ordinary politics:the practicability of integrity391

a.The object-related limitations of integrity391

b.The process-related limitations of integrity392

Ⅳ.The value of integrity392

1.The independence of integrity:the service conception of integrity393

2.Three arguments for an independent principle of integrity396

a.The argument of public morality396

ⅰ.The public duty of integrity396

ⅱ.From integrity to political judgement399

ⅲ.The relationship between integrity and justice in public morality401

b.The argument of communal responsibility403

ⅰ.The personal duty of integrity404

ⅱ.The community personified405

ⅲ.The communal responsibility of integrity406

c.The argument of authority qua authorship410

ⅰ.General410

ⅱ.Razian authority and integrity411

ⅲ.Raz’s counterargument415

Conclusion416

12.Conflicts of Constitutional Rights:Nature,Typology and Resolution419

Introduction419

Ⅰ.The nature of rights421

1.Moral rights or rights in general421

a.The modified interest theory of rights422

b.From interests to duties423

2.Legal rights424

Ⅱ.The nature of conflicts of rights425

1.Conflicts of moral rights or rights in general425

a.The inescapability of conflicts of rights425

b.Some responses to sceptical arguments427

2.Conflicts of legal rights430

a.The inescapability of conflicts of legal rights430

b.Some responses to sceptical arguments430

Ⅲ.The typology of conflicts of rights431

1.Conflicts of moral rights or rights in general431

2.Conflicts of legal rights435

Ⅳ.The resolution of conflicts of rights436

1.Conflicts of moral rights or rights in general436

a.General436

b.The qualitative priority of rights437

c.The quantitative weighing of rights439

ⅰ.The relative importance of the interests protected440

ⅱ.Some correctives440

d.Conciliation or prioritisation442

ⅰ.The case of rights of different stringencies442

ⅱ.The case of rights of equal stringency443

2.Conflicts of legal rights443

a.Internal resolution444

ⅰ.Hierarchy of rights444

ⅱ.Rules of conflict445

b.External resolution448

ⅰ.Weighing448

ⅱ.Conciliation or prioritisation449

ⅲ.Criteria of conciliation451

Conclusion453

SECTION FOUR:THE AUTHORITY OF LAW457

13.Coordination-based Obligations to Obey the Law459

Introduction459

Ⅰ.Definitions and delimitations461

1.The concept of authority461

2.The types of authority463

Ⅱ.The mixed pedigree of coordination-based duties to obey the law465

1.Natural duties to coordinate466

a.Root duties to coordinate466

ⅰ.The scope of natural duties467

ⅱ.The background of natural duties469

ⅲ.The stringency of natural duties470

b.Auxiliary duties to abide by the coordination outcome472

2.Acquired duties to coordinate473

a.Consent-based duties to coordinate473

b.Semi-voluntarily acquired duties to coordinate474

3.Mixed duties to coordinate475

Ⅲ.Coordination-based obligations qua obligations of fair play477

1.The main regime of fair play obligations478

a.The basic definition478

b.Two additional elements479

2.A general challenge:law as a cooperative scheme481

3.An additional condition483

a.The condition:the positive acceptance of benefits483

b.A general challenge:the idea of acceptance of benefits484

c.A specific challenge:the acceptance of legally procured benefits486

ⅰ.The willing acceptance of benefits487

ⅱ.The knowing acceptance of benefits489

Ⅳ.Raz’s three conditions for authority490

1.General490

2.Legal reasons to coordinate492

3.Conformity to the three theses493

a.The pre-emption thesis493

b.The dependence thesis495

c.The normal justification thesis496

ⅰ.A first challenge:the need for public identification497

ⅱ.A second challenge:the need for collective decision-making498

Conclusion499

14.Democracy,Disagreement and Disobedience503

Introduction503

Ⅰ.The authority of democratic law505

Ⅱ.Disobedience to democratic law506

1.Large-scale resistance:revolutionary resistance506

2.Small-scale resistance and civil disobedience in particular507

a.General508

b.Some constitutive elements508

ⅰ.Illegality509

ⅱ.Publicity510

ⅲ.Political and moral motivation510

ⅳ.Non-violence512

ⅴ.The exhaustion of legal means:ultima ratio512

ⅵ.The acceptance of the consequences of one’s actions and in particular one’s punishment513

Ⅲ.The justification of civil disobedience514

1.Legal justification514

a.A priori justification514

b.A posteriori justification515

2.Moral justification516

a.General516

b.Civil disobedience qua democratic test of legitimacy518

c.A few limitations to the justification of civil disobedience519

3.The right to civil disobedience522

Conclusion524

Conclusions527

Ⅰ.Taking reasonable disagreement seriously527

1.From disagreement to law and back again527

2.The rule of law as response to disagreement528

3.Disagreement as response to the rule of law530

4.Means to keep a balance532

Ⅱ.Towards global legal pluralism534

1.The idea534

2.Three illustrations535

Bibliography539

Index591

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摘要：本文以“The Morality of Conflict.pdf电子书版文档下载”为中心，从四个方面对电子书进行详细阐述，包括冲突的道德基础、冲突的伦理分析、冲突的道德实践以及冲突的道德教育。通过对电子书内容的深入分析，旨在揭示冲突的道德本质，为解决现实生活中的冲突提供有益的启示。

1、冲突的道德基础

《The Morality of Conflict.pdf电子书版文档下载》首先探讨了冲突的道德基础。作者认为，冲突是人类社会普遍存在的现象，其根源在于人类利益的差异和价值观的冲突。在道德层面，冲突的道德基础在于对个体权利和集体利益的尊重。作者强调，道德冲突并非简单的对立，而是需要在尊重个体权利的基础上，寻求集体利益的平衡。

在电子书中，作者详细分析了冲突的道德原则，如正义、公平、自由和责任等。这些原则为解决冲突提供了道德指导，有助于人们在面对冲突时，做出符合道德的选择。

此外，作者还探讨了道德冲突的根源，如社会制度、文化传统和个体心理等因素。通过对这些根源的分析，有助于我们更好地理解冲突的本质，为解决冲突提供理论依据。

2、冲突的伦理分析

《The Morality of Conflict.pdf电子书版文档下载》对冲突的伦理分析进行了深入探讨。作者认为，冲突的伦理分析应关注以下几个方面：冲突的起因、冲突的性质、冲突的解决方式以及冲突的道德责任。

在电子书中，作者以具体的案例为切入点，分析了不同类型冲突的伦理问题。例如，在环境保护与经济发展之间的冲突中，如何平衡两者之间的关系，既保护环境，又促进经济发展，成为了一个重要的伦理问题。

作者认为，解决冲突的伦理分析应遵循以下原则：尊重个体权利、维护社会正义、促进社会和谐以及实现共同发展。这些原则有助于我们在面对冲突时，做出符合伦理的选择。

3、冲突的道德实践

《The Morality of Conflict.pdf电子书版文档下载》对冲突的道德实践进行了详细阐述。作者认为，道德实践是解决冲突的关键。在道德实践中，人们应遵循以下原则：诚实、宽容、尊重和合作。

在电子书中，作者以实际案例为依据，分析了道德实践在解决冲突中的作用。例如，在家庭冲突中，通过诚实沟通、宽容对方、尊重彼此的感受以及合作解决问题，有助于化解家庭矛盾。

作者还强调了道德教育在冲突解决中的重要性。通过道德教育，可以提高人们的道德素养，使他们在面对冲突时，能够自觉地遵循道德原则，从而促进社会和谐。

4、冲突的道德教育

《The Morality of Conflict.pdf电子书版文档下载》对冲突的道德教育进行了深入探讨。作者认为，道德教育是解决冲突的重要手段。在道德教育中，应注重以下几个方面：培养道德意识、提高道德素养、增强道德判断力和培养道德实践能力。

在电子书中，作者以学校教育、家庭教育和社会教育为切入点，分析了道德教育在解决冲突中的作用。例如，在学校教育中，通过开展道德教育课程、组织道德实践活动，有助于培养学生的道德素养，提高他们的道德判断力。

作者还强调了道德教育在家庭和社会中的重要性。在家庭中，父母应注重培养孩子的道德素养，引导他们正确处理冲突；在社会中，应加强道德教育，提高人们的道德水平，从而为解决冲突创造良好的社会环境。

总结：

通过对“The Morality of Conflict.pdf电子书版文档下载”的深入分析，本文揭示了冲突的道德本质，为解决现实生活中的冲突提供了有益的启示。在道德层面，冲突并非简单的对立，而是需要在尊重个体权利的基础上，寻求集体利益的平衡。通过道德教育、道德实践和伦理分析，我们可以更好地应对冲突，促进社会和谐。

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